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  0ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the relationship between health care market structure 
and utilization of preventive care services, namely mammogram and Papanicolaou (Pap-
smear) screening. In addition to their life saving aspects, it is always believed that preventive 
health care services are important due to their cost-effectiveness which would prevail under 
managed competition. Yet, the nature of managed competition has been changing as a result 
of the backlash against it since the mid-1990s. We have yet to provide a clear answer to the 
question of how market structure affects the utilization of preventive care in general, and 
how the latest changes in health care market have been affecting it. These are the primary 
research questions of the paper. These research questions are answered by employing a new 
methodology that has not been used before. A multilevel modeling technique is employed to 
study the impact of changes in the structure of health care market on the utilization of 
mammogram and Pap-smear tests. In addition, an unusual data source, insurance claims 
data, rather than surveys or discharge data, is used in this study. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the accelerating presence of managed care organizations (MCOs) in the mid-
1980s, a new insurance regime has arisen in the U.S. health care system. For many, this new 
regime is a welcomed change from the previous one, characterized by overprovision and 
overutilization of expensive curative medical services in a less competitive health care 
market. In contrast, MCOs, especially health maintenance organizations (HMOs), of the new 
regime are believed to have increased the level of competition in the health care market. It is 
also believed that along with new methods of cost containment via different finance and 
delivery methods of health care services they have brought their emphasis on preventive 
care, rather than expensive curative care. Cost containment, competition, and the emphasis 
on preventive care are considered important and dominant aspects of this new regime in the 
U.S. health care system.  
Despite its initial success in declining health care expenditures and increasing 
utilization rates for preventive care, this new regime has changed structurally since the mid-
1990s. In a prosperous economy with a tight labor market, consumers and providers have 
resisted limited physician choice and restrictive financial and organizational aspects of health 
delivery, respectively (Miller, 1996; Berenson, 1997; Draper, 2002; Nichols et al., 2004; 
  1Robinson, 2001, 2002, and 2004). This, so-called, “backlash” against managed competition 
has resulted in just the opposite of what was promised by managed competition: loose 
network structures, elimination of some cost containment methods such as gate-keeping, 
referral system, restrictive out-of-network use, and a shift from emphasis on restrictive 
supply-side reimbursement methods (i.e., capitation) to less restrictive ones (i.e., partial 
capitation or fee-for-service), as well as the ever increasing role of demand-side cost sharing 
methods (i.e., copayments, deductibles, and coinsurance). As a result of these structural 
changes, the health care system has been dominated by new health plan types that are 
hybrids of traditional fee-for-service (FFS) plans and conventional HMOs. 
Inevitably, these interrelated aspects of changes in health care market structure and 
utilization of preventive care call into question those well established views on the 
relationship between competition in the health care market and utilization of preventive care 
through different health plans. In other words, whatever has happened to the utilization of 
preventive care as a result of these changes in the health care market structure? More 
importantly, what role, if any, does market structure play in terms of utilization of preventive 
care by different health plans? These are the primary research questions that are raised and 
empirically investigated in this study by employing a new methodology, namely multilevel 
analysis. 
 However, do we need a new methodology to answer these questions? The answer is 
yes for two reasons: the lack of empirical studies that consider the relationship between 
market structure and utilization of preventive care in general, and in relation to this, the lack 
of application of appropriate methodological tools to investigate the very same question. 
Regarding the former, existing studies in the empirical literature have always treated 
utilization of preventive care through FFS plans and HMOs as a yardstick to measure the 
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1991; Newman, 1997; Gordon et al., 1998; Potosky et al., 1998; Kemper et al. 
1999/2000). Yet this dichotomy can no longer apply due the ongoing structural changes in 
health care market. Moreover, the majority of these empirical studies have been interested in 
demographic factors (i.e., age, sex, schooling, income level, etc.), and organizational and 
financial aspects of health plan types (i.e., HMO vs. FFS) to explain differential rates of 
utilization usually by taking the market structure as given. Those studies that take into 
account market structure (i.e., either HMO penetration rates or HMO competition index), 
however, have only explained the impact of these forces in terms HMOs’ utilization rates for 
preventive services, rather than considering new plan types within the changing structure of 
the market (Wan et al., 1998; Decker and Hempsted, 1999). 
Another reason for a new study is the lack of application of appropriate 
methodology when a hierarchical data is used. By treating individual and market level 
variables at the same level in the same model, traditional linear and nonlinear models (i.e., 
logistic, ordinary least squares, etc.) have only partially explained the impact of these 
variables on the outcome. This would not be enough to consider, for example, variance 
within and among market level variables and thereby their direct and indirect impact on the 
outcome. As a result, estimation results would not be statistically sound since hierarchical 
structure of the data would result in biased parameter estimations in these models. 
Therefore, from a methodological point of view, those studies in the empirical literature that 
do not include market variables can be considered incomplete. On the other hand, those that 
include market variables into their analysis along with individual ones at the same level in 
traditional models simply ignore the hierarchical structure of data that they use. In order to 
avoid these problems of hierarchical structure of data, the present study proposes to employ 
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individual and market level variables in terms of likelihood of receiving preventive care (Guo 
and Zhao, 2000). 
In addition, data used in this study is different than the traditional ones extensively 
used in the literature such as surveys and (hospital) discharge data. This study employs 
insurance claims data for large employers. Therefore, the data makes it possible to figure out 
both actual utilization of services and detailed employment characteristics. In comparison 
with the existing studies, the present study has another advantage regarding employment 
characteristics. It employs detailed information about employment characteristics such as 
full-time or part-time employment, salary or hourly paid, unionized or not, which have been 
used rarely, if not at all, in the literature. In an employment-based private health insurance 
system, it is really important to see the impact of employment characteristics on the 
utilization of preventive care, especially mammogram and Pap-smear screening.  
2. A REVIEW OF MAMMOGRAM AND PAP-SMEAR UTILIZATION AND 
MARKET STRUCTURE IN THE U.S. 
 
As representative preventive care, mammogram and Pap-smear screening for breast 
and cervical cancer are analyzed in this study for two reasons. First, given the arguments 
about the effectiveness of many preventive care services, the mammogram and Pap-Smear 
are also considered cost-effective and life saving procedures. Second, it is well documented 
that the life saving aspect of these two procedures helps them to be ranked higher in priority 
lists of preventive care services (Marks and Lee, 2000).  
However, it is important note that there is still a tension concerning the question of 
what the appropriate balance between curative and preventive services is. Public health 
professionals are in favor of more preventive services to improve health. On the other hand, 
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ones (Russell, 1994). Other economists, who explain the phenomenon within the context of 
welfare analysis, try to figure out the most efficient or socially optimal level of prevention, 
which exists when the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs of preventive care (Kenkel, 
2000). In the final analysis, however, they are considered important preventive cares in 
general and utilization of such services depends upon availability, type, and characteristics of 
health insurance. 
Regarding the importance of having coverage for such services, it is well 
documented that insurance coverage increases (i.e., 5 percent) the utilization of preventive 
services, particularly mammogram and Pap-smear tests (Kenkel, 1994; Ayanian et al., 2000). 
In a similar vein, the likelihood of getting cancer detection procedures increased if one had 
private outpatient health insurance during 1989-1990 (Gordon et al., 1998). Despite the 
evidence, coverage and demand for preventive services do not necessarily lead to increasing 
utilization of such services. For example, coverage of mammography services is not 
sufficient to guarantee equivalent utilization of screening across income groups (Barton et 
al., 2001).  
Prior to the 1980s, HMOs clearly provided more preventive care than fee-for-
service, FFS, plans did (Luft, 1978, 1980). This trend continued during most of the 1990s 
(Bernstein et al., 1991). Some studies observed this explicit difference between HMOs and 
FFS even until late 1990s (Newman, 1997). For example, compared with indemnity type 
plans, HMO and independent practice association (IPA) type HMO coverage were 
associated with approximately three and two times greater likelihood of receiving a 
mammogram and Pap-smear for women aged between 50 and 64 and between 20 and 64, 
respectively  (Gordon et al., 1998). However, this gap between traditional FFS and 
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Potosky et al., 1998; Weinick and Beauregard, 1997). Although mammography screening was 
higher in managed care plans compared with FFS plans for women aged between 40 and 64 
years (i.e., 64.2 percent vs. 58.2 percent) and between 20 and 64 (i.e., 83.5 percent vs. 80.2 
percent) for mammogram and Pap-smear, respectively, the difference was not statistically 
significant for mammogram in a nationally representative cross-sectional survey in 1992 
(Potosky et al., 1998).  
One reason for the closing gap between traditional FFS and conventional HMO 
plans may be the fact that several states --at least 42 of them-- started to mandate the 
coverage of such services during the mid-1990s (Gordon et al., 1998; Potosky et al., 1998). 
Another reason may have to do with HMO specific organizational features such as greater 
access to plan based reminder systems by the physicians in staff or prepaid group model 
HMOs as well as the increasing numbers of new forms of managed care organizations such 
as for-profit IPAs, “managed-fee-for-service” type plans (i.e., PPOs or EPOs) (Potosky et 
al., 1998). Therefore, the clear-cut organizational differences between HMOs and FFS plans 
have disappeared, and so have respective screening rates by these plans. 
  For example, compared to plans without gate-keeping mechanisms, individuals 
enrolled in HMOs were more likely to receive mammograms by 20 percentage points, while 
the effect of HMOs on Pap smear was not significant (Deb and Trivedi, 2003).  In a similar 
vein, compared to group and staff model HMOs, for profit IPA and network model HMOs 
achieved a lower rate of mammography and Pap-smear tests for their enrollees (Wan et al., 
1998).  
  HMOs inevitably had an impact on providers and the way they deliver preventive 
services as well. For example, as health care organizations consolidated into integrated 
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mammography) (Kellie et al., 1996). In a similar vein, increasing HMO penetration resulted 
in a reduction in the number of mammography facilities/providers through consolidation 
and an increase in the number of services produced by the remaining providers (Baker and 
Brown, 1999).  
Another inevitable aspect of changes in health care market is the impact of demand-
side cost sharing methods (i.e., copayments, deductibles, etc.). For example, for HMO 
enrollees, a $5 office visit copayment for preventive care resulted in a decrease in physical 
examinations but did not significantly affect cancer screening tests received by women 
(Cherkin et al., 1990; Kenkel, 2000). Similarly, the probability of seeking preventive 
screening individually decreases for Pap-smear (from -3 percent to -9 percent) in both 
HMOs and PPO/Indemnity plans, and for mammography (-3 percent to -9 percent) but 
only in PPO/Indemnity plans (Solanski et al., 2000). 
  In an employment-based private health insurance system, employers and employees 
too can affect the utilization of preventive services due to their bargaining power over the 
content of coverage. One of factors in this regard is the presence of any worksite health 
promotion activities that are provided by employers. For example, overall the proportion of 
large employers in manufacturing and service industries that offered some type of cancer 
screening increased nationwide from about 4 percent in 1985 to 12 percent in 1992 (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services,1992). The same trend is observed when more 
of the firm’s employees are eligible for employment-related group health insurance (Kenkel 
and Supina, 1992), but likelihood of offering such programs decline with high employment 
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al., 2001). 
2
3. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The available analytical models on prevention in health economics literature are 
preoccupied with the demand for preventive care that is explained as consumers’ decision or 
insurers’ decision under uncertain circumstances (as in human capital and insurance models 
respectively) (Grossman, 1972; Schlesinger and Venezian, 1986; Kenkel, 2000). Empirical 
research on the utilization of preventive care, on the other hand, is based on ad hoc 
empirical modeling that does not necessarily follow analytical models suggested in the 
literature (Luft, 1978, 1980; Bernstein et al., 1991; Kenkel and Supina, 1992; Gordon et al., 
1994; Kenkel, 1994; Potosky et al., 1998; Wan et al., 1998; Decker and Hempstead, 1999; 
Solanki et al., 2000; Barton et al., 2001). 
  In addition, while the existing empirical studies put the emphasis on factors affecting 
utilization of such services at the individual level (i.e., age, sex, health status, income, type of 
health plan, etc.), they do not take into account market structure with the exception of few 
(Decker and Hempstead, 1999; Wan et al., 1998). However, utilization of such services 
depends also on health care market structure where the interactions between and among 
different health plans, and health plans and providers result in constantly changing benefit 
designs, premiums, cost-sharing mechanisms, and organizational structures to gain more 
share of the market. These strivings for higher market share lead to different market 
structures where individual level factors would ultimately be affected. 
                                                 
2 However, to my knowledge, health promotion programs seem the only aspect that has been studied in the 
literature in the context of preventive care utilization. That’s why the present study may contribute to the 
literature by taking into consideration different aspects of employment as mentioned in the introduction. 
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such as demographic and employment characteristics of consumers and organizational and 
financial characteristics of health plans and market level factors such as market share of 
health plans and degree of competition among them in the same market are related to each 
other in a hierarchical relationship. Hierarchical relationship (or multilevel relationship) is 
inspired from hierarchical linear modeling techniques (Hox, 2002). As is explained in the 
introduction, in such an empirical model, consumers are treated as members who are nested 
within different health insurance plans at the first level of this hierarchical structure. At the 
second level, consumers and their plans are perceived as nested within different health care 
markets that are characterized by market share of and competition between health plans. 
Specifically, I consider different levels of HMO penetration as the primary market structure 
variable due to this influence on other plans and providers. Then I consider different 
competitive strategies such as product differentiation and price competition under different 
levels of HMO penetration. 
  Individual Level Factors: The first set of individual level variables is consumers’ 
demographic characteristics such as age, sex, race, income, and education. According to the 
empirical evidence, there is an association between utilization of such services and higher 
income and education level. This may indicate the consciousness of consumers and their 
ability to afford preventive care. Both mammogram and Pap-smear screening are sex and age 
sensitive services (AHRQ, 2003). They are also mandated in some states as mentioned 
before. Race may also play an important role, since it is known that some racial groups fall 
behind the average in terms of preventive care utilization.  
  Despite few empirical investigations of direct effect of employment characteristics 
on the utilization of preventive care, they also play a major role. In general, availability of a 
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care. On the basis of empirical evidence and intuitive reasoning, it is safe to argue that full-
time, high-wage, unionized employees who are working in large firms with a worksite health 
promotion program are more likely to receive health insurance with better coverage and 
maybe higher contribution. Family coverage may also have a positive impact on the 
utilization.  
  Organizational characteristics of health plans must be taken into consideration as 
well. It is argued that centralized health plan structure that limit patients’ choice of providers 
with information sharing mechanisms (i.e., screening guidelines, newsletters, provider 
manuals, and other reminder systems) may increase utilization of preventive care (Tye et al., 
2004). Such a more established plan structure with established communication channels 
usually has a defined network, restricted out-of-network coverage, use of gatekeepers, and 
the use of cost containment measures such as penalty for second surgical opinion (Weinick 
and Beauregard, 1997; Tye et al., 2004).  
The most centralized health plan with such information sharing mechanisms, use of 
gatekeeper, and restricted out-of-network is the conventional or closed panel HMOs. 
However, there are hybrid health plans that range between the conventional HMOs and 
traditional FFS plans such as POS plans and PPOs. In comparison with conventional 
HMOs, most of these plans have relatively loose networks, gatekeepers, and information 
sharing mechanisms. Therefore, it may be appropriate to expect more preventive care 
through conventional HMO plans than hybrid plans contingent upon how they comply with 
organizational requirements similar to what conventional HMOs have. The traditional FFS 
plans that have none of these organizational features may rank last. 
  10  Finally, demand- and supply-side cost sharing mechanisms adopted by health plans 
can determine the utilization. Both empirical and theoretical evidences suggest that as the 
financial burden put on the shoulder of consumers via extensive demand-side cost sharing 
mechanisms (i.e., copayments, deductibles, and coinsurance) utilization of preventive care 
may decline. As a matter of fact, this has been a trend followed by almost all types of health 
plans in the U.S. As far as supply-side cost sharing mechanisms (i.e., fee-for-service, salary, 
and capitation) are considered, it has been argued that capitation based reimbursement (of 
physicians) usually encourage the utilization of preventive care. This financial strategy has 
still been followed by conventional or closed panel HMOs and some open panel HMOs 
(such as POS). However, majority of hybrid plans (such as PPOs and POS) have been 
adopting fee-for-service type of reimbursement. In sum, it may be highly likely to observe 
higher utilization rates among those plans that still use capitation payments. 
  Market Level Factors: Following empirical literature, market level variables are 
HMO penetration rate and HMO competition index in a given market, namely metropolitan 
statistical area, MSA. To understand the effect of HMO penetration in any health care 
market, I consider two simplifying market structures that affect utilization of preventive care 
differently: low and high HMO penetration. Then I discuss different competitive strategies 
under these scenarios. 
Low HMO Penetration: Low HMO penetration implies that traditional plans are 
dominant in the market. In such a traditional indemnity dominated market, barriers to entry 
such as a huge fixed cost of establishing a brand name and developing a network are higher 
(Nichols et al., 2004). Therefore, the number of HMOs that can sustain themselves in such 
markets will be fewer. Conventional HMOs may initially enter such traditional indemnity 
dominated markets with an offer of low premiums and copayments without or low 
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the U.S. They may also differentiate their product by emphasizing preventive care more.   
This, in turn, may attract younger and healthier patients (i.e., market segmentation). The 
impact of price competition, product differentiation, and market segmentation may be 
reinforced further with conventional HMOs’ alternative organization and delivery of 
services. That is, under a conventional HMO plan, a patient has to use a network of 
providers; otherwise he/she has to pay the full cost of services from an out-of-plan provider. 
In addition, conventional HMOs usually have well established information sharing systems 
such as reminder systems, especially for preventive care. As a result, traditional FFS plans 
may be left with older and less healthy patients. However, there may be still no reason for 
the FFS to react by changing its benefit structure as suggested in the literature since these 
plans still have the higher share of market. Thus, it may be more likely to receive preventive 
care through conventional HMOs than traditional FFS plans, PHMO > PFFS.  
One may question the absence of hybrid plans in this picture. As suggested above, 
due to high entry barriers and fixed costs, it may be really difficult to enter such markets 
from scratch. This may be true especially for hybrid plans. Historically hybrid HMO plans 
(i.e., POS) as well as PPOs have entered local markets by using the existing networks there 
(Nichols et al., 2004; Hurley et al., 2004). In addition, such plans historically emerged as a 
reaction of consumers and providers toward managed care and competition that are 
identified as well as idealized by conventional HMOs.  Given the low density of 
conventional HMOs in a market dominated by traditional FFS plans, there may be no room 
for such a reaction yet. Therefore, hybrid HMOs and PPOs may not have a big role to play 
in such markets. In short, in a market where HMO penetration is low, I expect to see the 
highest likelihood of receiving preventive care through conventional HMOs. This may be 
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respectively, PHMO > PHYBRID > PFFS  where P stands for probability. 
High HMO Penetration: If conventional HMOs can use their competitive price, 
market segmentation, and product differentiation strategies to increase their market share, 
they may dominate the market unless they confront any credible competitive pressure from 
their rivals including hybrid plans. This would be the scenario that has been suggested by the 
proponents of managed competition. Assuming that conventional HMOs do not face a 
credible threat from their rivals, they will lose market segmentation advantage due to high 
share of enrollees who would be enrolled in such HMOs. In addition, there may be an 
indirect pressure on traditional FFS plans since increasing HMO penetration may result in a 
spillover effect on FFS plans in terms of benefit structure through adopting some 
conventional HMO benefits including the emphasis on preventive care (Weinick and 
Beauregard, 1997). Moreover, increasing numbers of providers with conservative practice 
styles (i.e., spillover effects on providers) that are working for conventional HMOs may, in 
turn, help reduce the cost of health services received through FFS plans and increase the 
utilization of preventive care in the same market. However, at the same time, there may be 
an increasing cost on the HMO end of this development due to high HMO penetration. 
Besides losing market segmentation advantage, total cost of health care may be increasing 
due to increasing number of potential users of health services which become a significant 
financial burden for insurers (Russell, 1994). In sum, if conventional HMOs dominate and 
influence the market in terms of their impact on providers and FFS plans as suggested by the 
managed competition theory, it may still be highly or equally possible to receive preventive 
care through conventional HMOs and traditional FFS plans, PHMO ≥ PFFS.  
  13  What if conventional HMOs face a credible threat from their rivals that offer 
different organizational and financial incentives for consumers and providers? In other 
words, increasing HMO penetration may result in a backlash against conventional HMOs by 
consumers and providers as has been happening in reality (Miller, 1996; Berenson, 1997; 
Draper et al., 2002; Robinson, 2001, 2002, and 2004; Hurley et al., 2004; Nichols et al., 
2004). Such changes would shift market power from conventional HMOs to providers may 
result in observing a new hybrid type of health plans.  
These new hybrid plans design their benefit structure in such a way that it is not 
restrictive in terms of choosing providers for consumers and practicing styles for providers. 
In addition, they shift the financial responsibility from providers to consumers by imposing 
partial or no capitation and fee-for-service as supply-side cost sharing mechanisms, and by 
adopting coinsurance in addition to office copayments and deductibles as demand-side cost 
sharing mechanisms. Moreover, these plans differentiate their prices as well as products by 
creating tiers of networks and providers (Robinson, 2001, 2002, 2004). This last strategy can 
be considered a different type of market segmentation. In any event, these competitive 
strategies may make conventional or closed panel HMOs plans more open by loosening 
their network structure, softening requirements for gatekeeping, and imposing more 
demand-side cost sharing mechanisms. In a similar vein, traditional FFS plans may look 
more like PPOs by developing some relatively loose networks and adopt different demand-
side cost sharing mechanisms (i.e., copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles). 
In comparison with a market dominated by conventional HMOs or FFS plans, these 
changes blur the differences among health plans. Ultimately they negatively affect utilization 
of preventive care for two reasons. First, loosening structure of networks and information 
sharing mechanisms, elimination of gatekeeping, and return to fee-for-service type 
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Second, the presence of multiple contracts of providers with different health plans in such a 
market implies loosening affiliated network structure, multiple utilization review programs, 
and divergent practice guidelines from individual providers’ point of view which result in a 
limited, if not negative, impact on physicians’ practice styles that include their role in 
provision of preventive care (Berenson, 1997; Nichols et al., 2004).  
What would be the overall implication of such a market structure? Due to their 
organizational and financial advantages, conventional HMOs may still rank first. Increasing 
competitive pressure on traditional FFS plans may change their benefit structure in such a 
way that it may be equally or less possible to receive preventive care through such plans in 
comparison with conventional HMOs. Depending on the degree of loosening their 
organizational structure and the degree of applying demand-side cost sharing mechanisms, 
hybrid plans may perform as well as or less well than conventional HMOs. However, the 
difference between some open and closed panel HMOs may not be high. Therefore, PHMO ≥ 
PHYBRID and PHMO ≥ PFFS.  Moreover, there may be no big difference even between traditional 
FFS plans and hybrid ones, PHYBRID ≥ PFFS. However, if competition over market share 
further intensifies with increasing numbers of plans in the same market, it may even be 
possible to observe a better performance by traditional FFS plans over hybrid ones, PFFS ≥ 
PHYBRID, since hybrid plans may loosen their network structure via further reducing their 
influence on physicians.   
4. AN EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK: MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS 
A multilevel logit model is utilized to study the individual and market level 
determinants of the likelihood of receiving preventive care. The dependent variable in this 
study is binary: a person either receives preventive care (i.e., ‘1’) or does not receive it (i.e., 
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such as the following (Guo and Zhao, 2000, and Hox, 2002).  
The outcome variable can be defined as 
yij    = Binary response variable for i
th person (i.e., level-1) within j
th market (i.e., level-2). 
The probability of the response variable is defined as 
pij =Pr (yij =1) 
The probability of the response variable, pij, can be modeled by using logit link 
function with the standard assumption that yij has a Bernoulli distribution. Now, the model 
for the first level of analysis can be written as: 
Level-1 Model:  
log [pij /(1- pij)] =  α0j + βjXij       (1) where 
α0j     = Intercept term for j
th market,  
βj    = A vector of coefficients for individual or level-1 variables in j
th market, 
Xij     = A vector of individual level variables for i
th person within j
th market. 
Level-2 Models: 
α0j = γ00 + γ Zj+ uoj (2) and 
βj= β10 + β Zj + u1j   (3) where 
α0j = Intercept term for j
th market in Level-1 model, 
 γ00 =  Intercept term for Level-2 model, or grand mean (i.e., the logit of the average 
  probability of receiving a preventive care) for all markets,  
 Z = A vector of market level or Level-2 variables, 
 γ = A vector of coefficients for market level or Level-2 variables. 
β10= the coefficient for first level variables that depends upon market variables. 
  16β = A vector coefficients for the interaction between individual and market level 
 variables. 
Let’s plug (2) and (3) in (1); 
log [pij /(1- pij)] =  γ00 + β10Xij + βXij Zj + γ Zj + u1j  + uoj  (4) where 
u1j + uoj =Random effect due to random error terms  
γ00 + β10Xij +  βXij Z j + γ Z j = Fixed or systematic effect due to fixed coefficients or 
deterministic part of the model. 
While the fixed effect part of the model shows the impact of each variable (i.e., both 
individual market levels) on the outcome, the random part helps to figure out the varying 
likelihood of receiving a preventive care across different markets. In this study, I will plug 
only equation (2) into equation (1) and not use equation (3) above. 
3  
To justify a need for a multilevel analysis, however, it is necessary to compare 
intercept-only model for individual as well as multilevel logit models (Guo and Zhao, 2000). 
That is,  
log [pij /(1- pij)] =  α0j (5) 
log [pij /(1- pij)] =  γ00+ uoj  (6) 
                                                 
3 The present study employs SAS© statistical software from data compiling to regression analyses. Since 
multilevel modeling requires a different program from readily available ones, I use the %GLIMMIX macro 
for SAS©. It was written by Russ Wolfinger from SAS© Institute and it is available from the SAS© 
homepage. The address is the following (last visited on 01/19/2004): 
http:/ftp.sas.com.techsup/download/stat/glmm800.html. The macro is designed for the analysis of 
Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) (Little et al., 1996). It uses the principle of quasi-likelihood 
based on Wolfinger and O’Connell’s (1993) pseudo-likelihood function and an approximation to the 
likelihood function of the model that results in an iterative procedure repeatedly fitting a linear fixed model 
to a pseudo response. 
  17The purpose of intercept-only model estimations is to understand the significance of 
market variables in terms mammogram utilization analysis. One can use three important 
pieces of information by comparing (5) with (6). The first information is the comparison of 
the estimated values of intercept term in two models to see if there is any overestimation 
because of not taking into account differences among markets (i.e., MSAs). The second is 
the extent of random effect, that is, the variance of the intercept term in the intercept-only 
multilevel logit model (i.e., σ
2 γ00). In other words, the variance of the intercept term shows 
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2/3 is the variance of the standard logistic distribution.  
The intraclass, or intramarket in this study, correlation is the proportion of market 
level variance compared to the total variance. This will measure the extent to which a market 
level analysis can explain changes in the dependent variable (i.e., probability of utilization). 
Data, Sampling, and Variables: Two major data sources are used for consumer 
and market characteristics. Consumer characteristics including both demographic and 
medical variables came from Medstat’s the 1998 MarketScan® Commercial Claims & 
Encounters Database (2001). For market characteristics Interstudy MSA Profiles for 1998, 
Version 9.1 (1998) was used. 
The MarketScan databases reveal both inpatient and outpatient medical claims and 
demographic characteristics of more than 7 million employees and dependents covered by 
the health benefit programs of large employers. These claims data are collected from 
approximately 100 different insurance companies, Blue Cross Blue Shield plans, and third-
  18party administrators. The data used in this study represent the medical experience of insured 
employees and their dependents for active employees regardless of whether they receive 
mammogram and Pap-smear or not. 
Utilization of mammogram and Pap-smear services and patient characteristics are 
obtained from healthcare service use of individuals nationwide in outpatient commercial 
claims and encounters table in the database. 
4 Utilizations of mammogram and Pap-smear 
tests are identified according to primary procedural codes provided in the same data. These 
codes that indicate the use of mammography and Pap-smear tests for only routine screening 
(i.e., preventive) purposes are determined from 1998 Physicians’ Current Procedural 
Terminology (CPT-4) and screening codes in International Classification of Diseases 9th 
Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM). 
5 The codes that are used to identify preventive 
mammogram and Pap-smear test are presented in Table 1 in the appendix. 
Having identified mammogram and Pap-smear utilization, I created two initial 
samples for mammogram and Pap-smear by keeping the age range between 40 and 64 for 
the former and 20 and 64 for the latter by following the previous studies in the literature and 
official guidelines for such services.   
The initial samples consisted of a small number of enrollee with more than one plan. 
To be able to compare the likelihood of receiving mammograms and Pap-smears for 
enrollees with equal chance of access to the service, I included those enrollees with only one 
health plan in my analysis. In addition, in order to conduct empirical analysis on a common 
                                                 
4 The data used in empirical analysis include only those who used the service once in 1998. The original data 
included those who used the services more than once as well. The maximum was eight times–only for one 
patient- and seven times–only for two patients- for mammogram and Pap-smear respectively. 
5 Codes were identified with the help of Regula Burki, MD and Fellow of the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (FACOG), a clinical instructor in Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University 
of Utah and for the St. Mark's Family Medicine residency program in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
  19and reliable denominator of characteristics of patients, I only considered enrollees with at 
least 365 days of enrollment in the present study. 
6
As a result of data compilation, the following individual level variables are used in 
the analysis: consumers’ demographic characteristics (i.e., AGE, SPOUSE v.s. SELF, 
MEMBER DAYS OF ENROLLMENT), 
7 employment characteristics (i.e., PARTTIME vs. 
FULLTIME, UNION v.s. NONUNION, SALARY v.s. HOURLY), plan type (HMO, 
HMOPOS, HMOPOSCAP, PPO vs. TRADITIONAL), and coinsurance rate (20 percent or 
above, COIN1, vs. less than 20 percent, COIN2).  
The second major data source is Interstudy MSA Profiles used for market variables. 
From this data set, I used estimated HMO penetration rates (PEN798) and HMO 
competition index (IOC) for each MSA. HMO penetration is defined as the ratio of total 
numbers of HMO enrollees in an MSA to total numbers of enrollees in the same MSA. 
Index of competition is used as a measure of competitiveness of HMO market in an MSA. It 
is calculated as one minus the sum of the market shares squared. Therefore, the most 
competitive markets have values near one, while the least competitive will have values near 
zero.  
Market characteristics data were merged with consumer characteristics data with the 
help of MSA flags that were available in both data. For mammogram and Pap-smear 
samples, 298 and 302 different MSAs were observed, respectively. A complete list of 
variables and associated descriptive statistics for analysis of mammogram and Pap-smear 
utilization are provided in Table 2, 3, and 4, respectively in the appendix.. 
                                                 
6 I did not include those enrollees whose days of enrollment indicated irregularities and potential recording 
errors such as one day of enrollment or very short, interrupted enrollment days (i.e., 30 days) during 1998.  
7 Although empirical analysis is done for mammogram for two different age groups (between 35 and 64 v.s. 40 
and 64), only the latter is provided in this paper. For Pap-smear, four age groups are considered: 20-30, 31-40, 
41-50, and 51-64. The age group between 20 and 30 functions as the reference group. 
  205. RESULTS 
  A simple logistic regression model and a multilevel logistic regression model are 
employed at the individual and market level analyses, respectively. The results for 
mammogram are provided first in Table 5, and this is followed by Pap-smear in Table 7. 
  Mammogram Utilization: At the individual level, both an increase of 5 years in age 
and of 100 days in member days of enrollment increase, but not significantly, the likelihood 
of receiving mammogram approximately 1.1 times (see Table 5). On the other hand, 
compared with primary beneficiary, receiving the same service through a family coverage as a 
spouse reduces the likelihood 16 percent. Regarding employment characteristics, being a 
salary paid and unionized, rather than hourly paid and non-union, employee increases the 
likelihood 1.6 and 2.2 times, respectively. However, as expected, being a part-time, rather 
than full-time, employee reduces the likelihood approximately 25 percent.  
  Among health plans, both closed (i.e., HMO) and open panel HMOs (i.e., only 
HMOPOS) and PPOs reduce the likelihood 12, 18, and 20 percent in comparison with the 
TRADITIONAL plans, respectively. 
8 In addition, if the coinsurance is below 20 percent 
(COIN2), this increases the likelihood approximately 1.6 times. 
Before presenting the results for multilevel analysis, the need for such an analysis 
must be justified by comparing intercept-only individual level logistic model with that of 
multilevel one (see Table 6). The difference between logit and multilevel logit results for the 
intercept term estimation indicates that logistic regression fails to consider clustering within 
markets by overestimating the intercept by about 63 percent. 
9 Statistically significant 
variance of the intercept term also indicates the random effect of each individual market in 
addition to the fixed intercept term. Moreover, intramarket correlation in the same table 
                                                 
8 Closed panel HMOs are significant at 10 percent while HMOPOSCAP is not statistically significant. 
9 exp(-1.330) =0.26 v.s. exp(-2.316)=0.09). 
  21simply indicates that 63 percent of the variance of the outcome variable (i.e., mammogram 
utilization) can be explained at the market level. This significant magnitude implies that there 
is statistical evidence for market level analysis. Finally, since the extra-dispersion variable is 
not substantially different from 1 (i.e., 0.980), it can be concluded that the conditional 
variance of the errors is consistent with the assumed distribution (i.e., binomial). Therefore, 
there is no evidence for over- or under-dispersion that results in unreliable test statistics and 
standard errors.  
   According to the results (see Table 5), the impacts of age, member days of 
enrollment, and being a spouse do not change in terms of the likelihood of receiving 
mammogram at the market level. Although employment characteristics follow the same 
pattern in terms of their signs, their magnitude changes at the market level. While being a 
salaried and unionized employee increase the likelihood approximately 2 and 1.4 times, 
respectively, being a part-time employee reduces it 18 percent. Taking into account market 
variables certainly makes a difference. 
  In a similar vein, market level analysis changes the results for plan types. Compared 
with traditional plans, both open and closed panel HMOs (i.e., HMO, HMOPOS, and 
HMOPOSCAP) as well as PPOs increase the likelihood approximately 2, 1.2, 1.8, and 1.8 
times, respectively. 
10 Paying a coinsurance rate below 20 percent (COIN2) further increases 
the likelihood (i.e., 1.8 times) at the market level. 
  Finally, while a 10 percent increase in HMO penetration rates (PEN798) increases 
the likelihood 1.3 times, a simultaneous 10 percent increase in both HMO penetration and 
                                                 
10 All variables are statistically significant at 0.0001 except that HMOPOS is significant at 3 percent. 
  22competition reduces it 5 percent. 
11 However, HMO competition index is not found 
statistically significant.    
  Pap-Smear Utilization: According to individual level logistic regression results (see 
Table 7), increasing age reduces the likelihood of receiving Pap-smear approximately 22, 23, 
and 33 percent for age groups 31-40, 41-50, and 51-64, respectively, in comparison with the 
reference age group, 20-30. As in mammogram case, being a secondary beneficiary 
(SPOUSE) reduces the likelihood about 14 percent. On the other hand, a 100 member days 
of enrollment increases it approximately 1.8 times. In terms of employment characteristics, 
again being a salaried and unionized employee increase the likelihood almost 2 and 3 times, 
respectively, but part-time employment reduces it about 59 percent. Although signs of 
coefficients of these variables are the same for both mammogram and Pap-smear, their 
magnitude increases significantly for the latter. 
  As far as plan types are concerned, a similarity exists between mammogram and Pap-
smear: in reference to the traditional plan types, closed panel HMOs (HMO), an open panel 
HMO (HMOPOS), and PPOs reduce the likelihood 48, 26, and 24 percent, respectively. 
Yet, point-of-service plans with capitation (HMOPOSCAP), another type of open panel 
HMO, increase it about 1.3 times. In comparison with above 20 percent coinsurance rate, a 
coinsurance rate less than 20 percent increases the likelihood approximately 1.4 times.  
  Does market level analysis make a difference? 
12 For example, as in individual level 
analysis, increasing age reduces the likelihood with a relatively lesser amount: 20, 19, and 29 
                                                 
11 In addition to the intuitive reasoning (i.e., an increase in both penetration and competition), the use of 
interaction term in the multilevel model is justified on the grounds of improvements in statistical significance of 
market variables and increasing value of the extra dispersion scale that indicates an improvement in having 
reliable test statistics and standard errors. 
12 Market level analysis for Pap-smear is justified in a similar way that for mammogram. Again, the intercept 
only logistic regression for Pap-smear overestimates the intercept term by about 77 percent (i.e., exp(-2.0262) 
=0.13 v.s. exp(-3.5022)=0.03) and overdispersion parameter does not deviate much from 1 (i.e., 0.9501). These 
justify a statistically sound and necessary market level analysis. 
  23percent for age groups 31-40, 41-50, and 51-64. Being a spouse, rather than the primary 
beneficiary and an increase of 100 member days of enrollment have almost the same impact 
on the outcome: 20 percent less and about 1.1 more times likelihood. Although they have 
the same signs, employment characteristics have different values. For example, salaried and 
unionized employee are about 2.2 and 1.6 times more likely while part-time employees are 
approximately 33 percent less likely to receive the service. Note that since value and even 
signs of explanatory variables change at the market level, one can argue that relying on only 
individual level analysis can result in misleading conclusions.  
  Plan types have similar impacts at the market level as well. Only exception is that 
point of service plans with capitation (HMOPOSCAP) too have a negative impact on the 
outcome this time. In other words, both open (i.e., HMO) and closed panel HMOs (i.e., 
HMOPOS and HMOPOSCAP) as well as PPOs reduces the likelihood about 34, 67, 20, and 
27 percent, respectively. These are striking results in the sense that first, they are just the 
opposite of the results for mammogram, and second, they are different than individual level 
analysis for Pap-smear. One more time, these results imply that taking into account market 
level variables with an appropriate methodology has a vital importance in terms of sound 
statistical inference.  
  Finally, market level variables follow a similar pattern as in mammogram analysis. 
That is, a 10 percent increase in HMO penetration rate increases the likelihood about 1.4 
times while a 10 percent increase in both HMO penetration rate and competition index 
decreases it approximately 5 percent. However, HMO competition index (IOC) by itself is 
not statistically significant. 
  The Impact of Unions: Before finishing the presentation of results, it is worthwhile 
to look at some simulation exercises on the basis of empirical results in terms of 
  24understanding the impact of labor unions on the utilization of mammogram and Pap-smear. 
Table 8 and 9 present probabilities of mammogram and Pap-smear utilization by plan type 
for a representative enrollee, respectively. 
13 When both HMO penetration rates and the 
interaction term are at their mean values, being a labor union member or not significantly 
affects the probability. For example, if the enrollee has a closed panel HMO plan (HMO), 
the probability of receiving mammogram would be 21 and 16 percent for union and non-
union members, respectively (see table 8). The associated percentages for Pap-smear 
utilization would be 7 and 4 percent (see table 9). These estimations are consistent with both 
actual averages in the sample in Table 4 and logistic regression results in Table 5 and 7, 
respectively. 
  To demonstrate the impact of competition in health care market, one can consider 
estimation based on a one standard deviation below and above the mean value of the 
interaction term while the penetration rates are at their mean value (see column III in Table 
8 and 9). A one standard deviation below the interaction term, the probability of receiving 
mammogram increases up to 30 and 24 percent for the same representative enrollee with 
and without union membership, respectively. On the other hand, a one standard deviation 
above the interaction term, the associated percentages decline significantly: 14 and 11 
percent. The same pattern applies to Pap-smear utilization with the exception that the 
impact is much more significant in terms of the magnitude (i.e., 10 and 7 percent v.s. 4 and 3 
percent, see Table 9). 
6. DISCUSSION 
  There are three important areas of findings in this study: demographic 
characteristics, health plan type, and impact of market forces. It seems that both Pap-smear 
                                                 
13 Characteristics of representative enrollees are explained at the bottom of each table. 
  25and mammogram utilization are affected by the demographic characteristics in a similar way. 
According to the multilevel logit regression results for Pap-smear and mammogram, member 
days of enrollment help increase the likelihood of receiving these services. However, its 
overall impact is negligible. Being a secondary beneficiary (i.e., spouse) reduces the likelihood 
of receiving both mammogram Pap-smear tests. On the basis of these results, it is reasonable 
to conclude that having a family plan may not automatically guarantee access to the 
preventive care services for spouses.  
  Employment related variables significantly contribute to the explanation of the 
likelihood of receiving mammogram and Pap-smear. For example, working in a part-time job 
always and significantly reduces the likelihood of receiving these services. In a similar vein, 
labor union membership significantly and positively affects the outcome. Despite the 
declining overall unionization rates across different industries in the U.S., it seems that 
unions still have a strong influence on health benefits in general, and preventive care in 
particular.  
As a demand-side cost sharing mechanism, coinsurance rates also affect the 
outcome. Paying less than 20 percent coinsurance positively affects the likelihood of 
receiving mammogram and Pap-smear test. In addition, the magnitude of its impact is also 
considerable. Given the current trend in which insurers adopt coinsurance rates more often 
and shift the financial responsibility from employers and providers toward the consumer 
with such demand-side cost sharing mechanisms, the importance of coinsurance rates with 
respect to preventive care utilization is very important. 
  One of the most important findings of this study is the role played by health 
insurance plans. It is evident that closed panel HMOs and open panel HMOs (i.e., 
HMOPOS, HMOPOSCAP) increase the likelihood of receiving mammograms in 
  26comparison with the traditional plans. However, this is not true for Pap-smears. One 
explanation for these opposite findings may be state mandates that are imposed for 
mammograms, but not for Pap-smears. In addition, the latter is suggested for a wider range 
of age group that may result in a significant cost from insurers’ point of view. Increasing 
trends of loose networks, less restrictive reimbursement methods with increasing demand-
side cost sharing methods through hybrid plans create an environment in which even the 
most standardized and suggested preventive care may not be adequately provided by such 
plans.  
These results also indicate that traditional dichotomy between HMO vs. FFS plans 
may no longer apply. It is more realistic to take into consideration changes in health plan 
organization and financing of health care services. This can be done by taking into account 
health care market structure as well as individual level characteristics in an appropriate model 
that can promote better understanding of the existing trend that has been observed in the 
literature. 
  In relation to the findings mentioned above, there is no doubt that changes in the 
utilization of preventive care are closely related to and affected by market structure. For 
example, for both mammograms and Pap-smears, increasing HMO penetration per se 
increases the likelihood of receiving services. HMO competition per se, however, is not 
significant for both Pap-smear and mammogram utilization. But one thing is clear: a 
simultaneous increase in HMO penetration and competition certainly reduces the likelihood 
of receiving both mammograms and Pap-smears. This last result calls into question the faith 
in competitive markets that competition yields more preventive care. Both the estimated 
odds ratios and probability estimations on the basis of the empirical results show that highly 
  27competitive HMO markets with high HMO penetration reduce the likelihood of receiving 
both types of preventive care through all health plan types.  
On the basis of empirical results of this study, one may partly explain  why the 
likelihood of receiving the mammogram is higher than that of Pap-smear in the context of 
mandates about preventive care coverage that are imposed by many states. It seems that 
some of the plans such as PPOs enjoy the lack of any mandates and regulations that are 
imposed by local governments on other plans types such as conventional HMOs. This in 
turn makes PPO type organizational and financial arrangements attractive for other plan 
types. The ultimate result is that one way or another health plans may avoid mandates and 
regulations, including those related to preventive care. In other words, market forces seem to 
say the final words. These results imply that the faith in market forces in terms of receiving 
more preventive care must be seriously reconsidered on the basis of the nature of 
competition in the health care market. This consideration becomes vital when one takes into 
account the proven efficiency of the Pap-smear test and mammogram in terms of life saving. 
Therefore, I argue that the lack of any specific regulation or mandate about Pap-smear 
coverage may be the primary reason why we have such a low likelihood of receiving it 
through even the most popular health plan types. If one cannot change the direction of 
structural changes that have been taking place in the health care market, one can at least 
make sure about the coverage of preventive care by all types of health insurance 
arrangements with such mandates or regulations. 
  Given the empirical results, what type of policy recommendations can be suggested? 
There is no doubt that any solution to the provision and utilization of preventive care is not 
independent of the structural changes and other problems in the U.S. health care system. 
However, this does not change the fact that preventive care is still considered one of the 
  28important health services reducing increasing health care costs that is the epicenter of the 
problems in the system. Therefore, an ideal solution that concerns preventive care has to do 
with the fact that all the parties involved in decision making should make such services their 
priority in their agenda. Although it may not be easy or feasible to change the direction of 
the health care market in the short run, I suggest an immediate policy measure that can be 
conducted: to make preventive care provisions and coverage mandatory for both insurers 
and employers. 
  Of course, this process also involves employers and employees. The existing trend 
shows that employers are offering health plans with broad benefits but with more 
contribution by employees in a slow growing economy with a less tight labor market. There 
is no doubt this is possible due to very flexible labor market conditions in the U.S., which are 
characterized by the increasing number of hourly paid part-time jobs and declining 
unionization rates. Since employees receive their health benefits through their jobs and they 
have not much saying in terms of the extent and the cost of those benefits especially in a 
relatively relaxed labor market environment, as an immediate solution in the short-run, there 
should be some labor market regulations that mandate employers’ provision of and 
contribution to health insurance plans with at least basic and standard preventive care 
coverage. Of course, this may not be welcomed by employers although such basic health 
benefits that are defined around preventive care can reduce their overall health care costs 
and increase the productivity of work force. At the same time, it seems that unions can play 
a significant role by demanding such health benefits despite their declining popularity and 
presence. However, increasing unionization is not a short term issue since it is determined by 
historical, political, and economic factors.   
  29Limitations of the Study: There is no doubt that this study has certain limitations. 
For example, compared to many studies in the empirical literature, the data used in this study 
lacked certain key demographic variables such as income and schooling levels of enrollees, 
race, and health status. Absence of these control variables may result in biased estimations 
with respect to different plan types.  
The data are also limited by mostly large corporations providing information. 
Therefore, small business firms and other large corporations that did not provide 
information are not considered in the study. In that sense, the results cannot be generalized 
for employers of all sizes.  
In addition, claims data are used in this study. One shortcoming of using claims data 
is that they report only those paid claims. If the service is used but not paid, it will not show 
up in the data. Finally, only utilization of Pap-smears and mammograms are studied here. 
Despite their importance and effectiveness against cancer, the results of the study may not 
be generalized to other cancer screening tests and procedures due to diverse features and 
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  35Table 1. CPT-4 and ICD-9 Codes of Mammography and Pap-smear  
Tests for Screening Purposes 
 
Procedure & Screening codes  For Mammogram  For Pap-Smear 
88141:Cytopathology, cervical or 
vaginal (any reporting system); 
requiring interpretation by 
physician (list separately in addition 
to code for technical services) 
88142: Cytopathology, cervical or 
vaginal (any reporting system); 
collected in preservative fluid, 
automated thin layer preparation, 
screening by cytotechnologist 
under physician supervision 
 88150:Cytopathology, smears, 
cervical or vaginal, up to three 
smears; screening by technician 
under physician supervision 
 88152: With manual 
cytotechnologist screening and 
automated screening under 
physician supervision 
Physician’s Current Procedural 
Terminology (CPT-4), 4th 
Edition-1997 Procedure Codes 
76092: Screening mammography, 
bilateral (two view film study of 
each breast) 
88156: Cytopathology, smears, 
cervical or vaginal, (the Bethesda 
System (TBS)),up to three smears; 
screening by technician under 
physician supervision 
The International Classification 
of Diseases, 9th Revision, 
Clinical Modification (ICD-9-
CM) Screening Codes 
V76.11: Screening mammogram 
for high risk patients 
V72.3: Gynecological examination; 
Papanicolaou cervical smear as part 








  36Table 2. List of Variables That Are Used in Empirical Analysis  
Variable Name  Description of Variable  Value of variable 
MAMO Mammogram  utilization  indicator  Dichotomous 
PAP  Pap-Smear utilization indicator  Dichotomous 
AGE  Age of enrollee (For mammogram analysis)  Continuous 
AGE_1 20  ≤  Age of enrollee ≤30 (For Pap-smear analysis)  Dichotomous 
AGE_2 31  ≤  Age of enrollee ≤40 (For Pap-smear analysis)  Dichotomous 
AGE_3 41  ≤  Age of enrollee ≤50 (For Pap-smear analysis)  Dichotomous 
AGE_4 51  ≤  Age of enrollee ≤64 (For Pap-smear analysis)  Dichotomous 
SPOUSE  Relation to employee (Secondary Beneficiary)  Dichotomous 
SELF  Relation to employee (Primary Beneficiary)  Dichotomous 
MEM_SUM  Total Member Days of Enrollment  Continuous 
SALARY Salary  paid  employee  Dichotomous 
HOURLY 
 
Hourly paid employee  Dichotomous 
FULLTIME  Employment Status: Full-time Employee  Dichotomous 
PARTTIME  Employment Status: Part-time Employee  Dichotomous 
NOUNION  Union Membership: Non-Union Member  Dichotomous 
UNION  Union Membership: Member  Dichotomous 
COIN1 or COINS_1  Coinsurance Rate: 20% and above  Dichotomous 
COIN2 or COINS_2  Coinsurance Rate: Less than 20%  Dichotomous 
TRAD Traditional  Plan  Dichotomous 
HMO Health  Maintenance  Organization Dichotomous 
HMOPOS Point-of-Service  Plan  Dichotomous 
HMOPOSCAP  Partially or Fully Capitated Point-of-Service Plan  Dichotomous 
PPO Preferred  Provider  Organization Dichotomous 
PEN798  HMO Penetration Rate (%)  Continuous 
IOC  HMO Competition Index (%)  Continuous 










  37Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Mammogram: Age Between 40 and 64 
 
 Mean   
(Std. Dev.) 
 




















MAMO Mammogram  utilization 





































































































































  38Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Pap-Smear Data: Age Between 20 and 64  
 
   Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
  
























































































































































  39Table 5. Individual & Multilevel Logistic Regression Results for Mammogram Utilization 
 
 
  Individual Level Logistic Regression 
(N=70280; LR=5100.3831; p<0.0001) 
Multilevel Logistic Regression 
(N=70280; Deviance=64369.6120; Extra-
Dispersion Scale =0.9762) 
Variable Name  Coefficient 
(Std. Er.) 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI)  P-Value  Coefficient 
(Std. Er.) 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI)  Pr>/t/ 
INTERCEPT  -4.325 
(0.109)   <0.0001  -4.866 
(0.282)   <0.0001 











































































































































(a)= Estimated odds ratios for an increase of 5 years in age; (b)= Estimated odds ratios for an increase of 100 days in 
member days of enrollment; (c)= Estimated odds ratios for an increase of 10% in HMO penetration rate; (d)= Estimated 
odds ratios for an increase of 10% in HMO competition index; (e)= Estimated odds ratios for an increase of 100 units in 
the interaction term. 
 Table 6. Intercept-Only Logistic and Multilevel Intercept-Only Logistic  
Models for Mammogram & Pap-Smear 
 





ammogram (40-6   p-Smear (20-6
(0=Not received: 61460
Received: 1522
(0=Not received: 110716;  
Received: 1459
  Logit Multilevel  Logit Multilevel 

















   
(0.004)
c
     
σ  0.711  1.3184
Deviance  65219.057  7 1 
ρ) 
g  L  72090.96   9 8  
2 
    6189.359
Extra-Dispersion Scale    0.980    0.9501 
Intra-Market (i.e., MSA) Correlation (  0.63   0.77 
-2Lo 0186.2
N 70280  70280  125312  12531
 
a Pr>ChiSq <0.0001; 
b Pr > [t] <0.0001;  
c Pr [Z] <0.000
 = σ2u/(σ2u + σ2e), where σ2u =the total variance of errors and σ2e =π







































  Individual Level Logistic Regression 
(N=125312; LR=10201.5784 p<0.0001) 
Multilevel Logistic Regression 
(N=70280; Deviance=64369.6120; Extra-Dispersion Scale =0.9762) 
Variable Name  Coefficient 
(Std. Er.) 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI)  P-Value  Coefficient 
(Std. Er.) 
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI)  Pr>/t/ 
INTERCEPT  -3.955 
(0.076)          <0.0001 -4.297 
(0.306)  <0.0001
AGE_2 (Refer= AGE_1)  -0.251 
(0.030) 
0.778 
(0.733-0.826)  <0.0001  -0.219 
(0.030) 
0.803 
(0.780-0.827)  <0.0001 
AGE_3 (Refer= AGE_1)  -0.263 
(0.028) 
0.768 
(0.727-0.812)  <0.0001  -0.207 
(0.028) 
0.813 
(0.791-0.836)  <0.0001 
AGE-4 (Refer= AGE_1)  -0.397 
(0.031) 
0.672 
(0.633-0.714)  <0.0001  -0.339 
(0.031) 
0.712 
(0.691-0.734)  <0.0001 
SPOUSE  (Refer=Self)  -0.148 
(0.020) 
0.863 
(0.829-0.898)  <0.0001  -0.150 
(0.021) 
0.860 
(0.844-0.878)  <0.0001 
MEM_SUM  0.002 
(0.001) 
1.175 a
(1.165-1.184)  <0.0001  0.001 
(0.001) 
1.077a
(1.068-1.086)  <0.0001 
PARTTIME (Refer=Fulltime)  -0.895 
(0.074) 
0.409 
(0.353-0.473)  <0.0001  -0.404 
(0.077) 
0.667 
(0.620-0.719)  <0.0001 
SALARY (Refer=Hourly)  0.682 
(0.042) 
1.978 
(1.821-2.148)  <0.0001  0.810 
(0.047) 
2.247 
(2.148-2.350)  <0.0001 
UNION (Refer=Nonunion)  1.151 
(0.045) 
3.160 
(2.895-3.450)  <0.0001  0.448 
(0.054) 
1.565 
(1.486-1.647)  <0.0001 
COIN2 (Refer= ≥20%)  0.321 
(0.066) 
1.378 
(1.210-1.569)  <0.0001  0.806 
(0.077) 
2.239 
(2.079-2.411)  <0.0001 
HMO (Refer=Traditional)  -0.662 
(0.082) 
0.516 
(0.439-0.606)  <0.0001  -0.417 
(0.107) 
0.659 
(0.595-0.730)  <0.0001 
HMOPOS (Refer=Traditional)  -0.297 
(0.061) 
0.743 
(0.659-0.838)  <0.0001  -1.110 
(0.101) 
0.330 
(0.299-0.363)  <0.0001 
HMOPOSCAP(Refer=Traditional)  0.232 
(0.053) 
1.261 
(1.136-1.399)  <0.0001  -0.225 
(0.091) 
0.799 
(0.732-0.872)  0.0140 
PPO (Refer=Traditional)  -0.271 
(0.061) 
0.762 
(0.676-0.859)  <0.0001  -0.311 
(0.085) 
0.733 
(0.675-0.796)  0.0003 
PEN798 (HMO Penetration Rates)  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  0.031 
(0.014) 
1.362b
(1.191-1.558)  0.0270 
IOC (HMO Competition Index)  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  -0.005 
(0.005) 
1.054c
(1.001-1.110)  0.3262 
PEN798*IOC (Interaction Term)  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  -0.0005 
(0.0002) 
0.948d
(0.929-0.968)  0.0140 
 
 
(a)= Estimated odds ratios for an increase of 100 days in member days of enrollment; (b)= Estimated odds ratios for an increase of 10% in HMO penetration rate; (c)= Estimated odds 
ratios for an increase of 10% in HMO competition index; (d)= Estimated odds ratios for an increase of 100 units in the interaction term. 
 
  42Table 8. Estimated Probabilities of Mammogram Utilization by Plan Types* 
    (I) Both PEN798 
& PEN798*IOC 
at their me are  an 
at its mean value  
(I t 
its mean value 
values   




(µ PEN798  - σPEN798)
2 





(µPEN798*IOC  +  
PEN798*IOC
 - 












P :  HMO 0.21  0.16 0.17  0.13 0.26 0.20 0.30 0.24 0.14  0.11 
P :  POS 0.14  0.11 0.11  0.08 0.18 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.09  0.07 
PPOSCAP: 
  0.19  0.15 0.15  0.12 0.23 0.18 0.27 0.21 0.13 
PPPO:  0.19  0.15 0.16  0.12 0.24 0.19 0.28 0.22 0.13  0.10 




















* All the estimations in the table based on the results for multilevel model with the interaction term in Table5.15. Estimated probabilities for 
a primary beneficiary who is at the mean age (i.e., 48.3), working full-time, unionized/non-union (see shaded columns) with a health plan 
that offers less than 20% coinsurance rate with the mean member days of enrollment (i.e., 461.9). In probability calculations, market 
variable of interest (columns labeled with roman numerals I, II, and III of the table below) are subject to the following calculations: 
(I): Mean values of both PEN798 & PEN798*IOC. 
(II): Mean value of PEN798*IOC; (1) mean value of PEN798 minus one standard deviation of PEN798; (2) mean value of PEN798 plus 
one standard deviation of PEN798. 
(III): Mean value PEN798; (1) mean value of PEN798*IOC minus one standard deviation of PEN798*IOC; (2) mean value of 





  43Table 9. Estimated Probabilities of Pap-smear Utilization by Plan Types* 
    (I) Both PEN798 
& 
PEN798*IOC 
are  ean 
alues




v    




(µ - σ )
2 
(µ + σ ) 
1 
PEN798*IOC





µ  )   PEN798   PEN798 PEN798  PEN798 (µ   - 
PE C
(µ +   Probabilities by 











PHMO:  0.07  0.04 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.04  0.03 
PPOS:  0.04  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 
PPOSCAP: 
  0.09  0.05 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.05  0.03 
PPPO:  0.08  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.05  0.03 





















* All the estimations in the table based on the results for the multilevel model with the interaction term in Table 7. Estimated probabilities 
for a primary beneficiary who is in the base age group  (i.e., 20-30), working full-time, unionized/non-union (see shaded columns) with a 
health plan that offers less than 20% coinsurance rate and with the mean member days of enrollment (i.e., 445.2). In probability 
calculations, market variable of interest (columns labeled with roman numerals I, II, and III of the table below) are subject to the following 
calculations: 
(I): Mean values of both PEN798 & PEN798*IOC. 
(II): Mean value of PEN798*IOC; (1) mean value of PEN798 minus one standard deviation of PEN798; (2) mean value of PEN798 plus 
one standard deviation of PEN798. 
(III): Mean value PEN798; (1) mean value of PEN798*IOC minus one standard deviation of PEN798*IOC; (2) mean value of 
PEN798*IOC plus one standard deviation of PEN798*IOC. 
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